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В настоящей статье я собираюсь показать различение неотделимости и зависимости у Ингарде-
на. Мои размышления носят как исторический, так и систематический характер. Историческая 
сторона статьи преследует двоякую цель: во-первых, я показываю, что в идущей от Брентано 
традиции проблема экзистенциальной (или, шире, онтологической) обусловленности была пе-
ренесена в теории о соотношении части и целого. Лучшими примерами подобного подхода вы-
ступают теория предметов Казимира Твардовского и учение Эдмунда Гуссерля о части и целом. 
Во-вторых, я освещаю тот контекст, в котором Ингарден провёл границу между неотделимо-
стью и зависимостью. Кроме того, в статье показана мотивация Ингардена: проблема понима-
ния Гуссерлевской концепции «имманентной трансценденции», проблема существования чи-
сто интенциональных объектов и, наконец, проблема соотношения индивидуальных объектов 
и идей. Систематическая часть посвящена неоднозначности Ингарденовского определения не-
отделимости. Я предпринимаю попытку усовершенствовать это определение, ссылаясь на раз-
личие (сделанное самим Ингарденом) между абсолютной и суммарной целостностью. Я также 
привожу некоторые деления неотделимости и зависимости и исследую, являются ли эти типы 
экзистенциальной обусловленности рефлексивными, симметричными или транзитивными.
Ключевые слова: неотделимость, зависимость, абсолютная целостность, суммарная целост-
ность, Роман Ингарден, Эдмунд Гуссерль, Казимир Твардовский.
1. INTRODUCTION
If one accepts Aristotelian substantialism, she usually is convinced that accidents 
are somehow conditioned in existence by their bearers: substances. If our Aristotelian 
scholar is also a theist, she maintains that created beings are existentially conditioned 
by God. But does she have in mind exactly the same type of existential conditioning? 
We intuitively feel that although accidents are distinct from their respective substance, 
they are not separate objects and they cannot be separated from their bearer. In contrast 
to this, created beings are separate from God although they cannot exist without God. 
This difference can be expressed accordingly in terms of inseparability and dependence, 
which was introduced by Roman Ingarden when developing his ontology. Accidents are 
inseparable from their substances but created beings are dependent on God. 
In this paper I present the Ingardenian distinction between inseparability and 
dependence. This distinction is absent from contemporary analytical metaphysics al-
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though it seems to be very useful, particularly in the context of the problem of the 
inner structures of objects1. 
My considerations are both historical and systematic. In the second section I 
show that in the Brentanian tradition the problem of existential (ontological) con-
ditioning was entangled in parts—whole theories. The best examples of such an 
approach are Kazimierz Twardowski’s theory of objects and Edmund Husserl’s the-
ory of parts and wholes. Section three exhibits the context within which Ingarden 
distinguished inseparability and dependence. Moreover, Ingarden’s motivations are 
presented: a problem with understanding Husserlian “immanent transcendence,” the 
issue of the existence of purely intentional objects, and the problem of the relationship 
between individual objects and ideas. Section four deals with the ambiguity of Ing-
arden’s definition of inseparability. I improve upon this definition through reference 
to Ingarden’s distinction between absolute and summative wholes. Finally, I present 
several divisions of inseparability and dependence and investigate whether these types 
of existential conditioning are reflexive, symmetric, or transitive.
At the beginning, however, a terminological remark is necessary. The term “in-
separability” is my translation of „Unselbständigkeit“, „Unablösbarkeit“2, and the Polish 
term “niesamodzielność”. The first of the German terms and the latter Polish one are 
sometimes translated as “non-self-sufficiency” (Szylewicz),“non-independence” (Find-
lay), or simply as “dependence” (Simons). Due to that fact that Ingarden wanted to em-
phasize that unselbständig entities can exist only within a whole, I think that the term 
“inseparability” is more suitable. “Separability” is my translation of „Selbständigkeit“, 
„Ablösbarkeit“, and “samodzielność” as well. “Dependence” stands for the German term 
„Abhängigkeit“ and the Polish term “zależność”. “Independence” is also my translation 
of „Unabhängigkeit“ and “niezależność”. Adjectives corresponding to the above nouns 
are translated as “inseparable,” “separable,” dependent,” and “independent”3. 
2. THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENTIAL CONDITIONING AS ENTANGLED IN  
THE PARTS-WHOLE THEORY: TWARDOWSKI AND HUSSERL
In his most known book, On the Content and Object of Presentations, Kazimierz 
Twardowski not only explicates his work’s title distinction but also builds a very origi-
nal and sophisticated (for critics: intricate) theory of the object. An object is conceived 
1 I tried to apply the Ingardenian distinction in this area. See Piwowarczyk (2019).
2 This translation of „Unablösbarkeit“ is made strictly in the context of Twardowski’s theory.
3 In accordance with these terminological decisions I have allowed myself to modify the English 
translations of some cited works.
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by him as a composed whole having different types of parts. Twardowski provides 
many divisions which distinguish such types of parts as: physical and metaphysical, 
material and formal (among the latter: primary and secondary), and parts of different 
ranks, orders, and degrees. For the purposes of this paper there is no need to analyze 
all these concepts. In lieu of this, I focus only on the distinction between the depend-
ent (abhängig) and independent (unabhängig) parts of objects. Initially, Twardowski 
defines these parts in existential terms. Thus we have:
1. Independent parts “which can also exist by themselves, separated from the 
whole whose parts they are” (Twardowski, 1977, 48).
2. Unilaterally dependent parts “whose existence depends on others, while 
the existence of these other constituents does not depend on them” (Twar-
dowski, 1977, 48–49).
3. Mutually dependent parts “which depend for their existence mutually on 
each other” (Twardowski, 1977, 49).
Twardowski elaborated his theory of the object as applicable to both existent 
and nonexistent objects. Therefore, the value of the presented division was limited 
and Twardowski sought to replace existential criterion with the criterion of conceiva-
bility. At the same time, he felt forced to admit that this new criterion was more suit-
able for the parts constituting the content of presentations (Twardowski, 1977, 49). In 
this context, Twardowski uses the words “separability” (Ablösbarkeit) and “insepara-
bility” (Unablösbarkeit) and speaks of (Twardowski, 1977, 61):
1. Mutually separable parts: such parts, which can be conceived of without 
conceiving of other parts.
2. Mutually inseparable parts: such parts that can be distinguished but cannot 
be conceived of without each other.
3. Unilaterally separable parts: exemplified by parts A and B, such that A can 
be conceived of without B but B cannot be conceived of without A. 
In this new division and in the previous one as well, Twardowski does not take 
into account the unilateral inseparability. Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein4 supposes that 
4 Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein was born in 1905. After her studies at Lvov University under Kazimi-
erz Twardowski she was a very active member of The Polish Philosophical Society. In 1928 Gins-
berg-Blaustein studied in Berlin where she attended the lectures of Carl Stumpf, Max Wertheimer, 
Kurt Lewin, and Wolfgang Kohler. In 1930 she married Leopold Blaustein—a disciple of Kazimierz 
Twardowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and Roman Ingarden. She was killed by Germans in 1942 (ac-
cording to some sources in 1944)  in Lvov. Her contribution to the phenomenological theory of 
dependence is analyzed in Żegleń (2018) and Magdziak (2016). On Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy 
see Płotka (2020).
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this decision was motivated by the identity of the extensions, but obviously not of 
the intensions, of the concept of unilaterally inseparable parts and of the concept of 
unilaterally separable parts: if A and B are unilaterally separable then they are also 
unilaterally inseparable and vice versa (Ginsberg, 1982, 284, fn. 13). In any case, the 
list could be completed with the concept of unilateral inseparability.
As an example of mutually separable parts, Twardowski gives the parts of the 
presentation of a book, i.e., the presentations of the individual pages and cover of a 
book. On the other hand, mutually inseparable parts are comparable to, for instance, 
the presentations of a surface and color. Presentations of a genus and of a subordi-
nated species serve as an example of one-sided separability or inseparability: a color 
is unilaterally separable from redness and redness is unilaterally inseparable from a 
color (Twardowski, 1977, 61–62). 
Concepts of inseparability (Unablösbarkeit) and separability (Ablösbarkeit) were 
in use in the Brentanian tradition at least since Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis 
(1889), the work which Twardowski refers to. The aforementioned Polish philosopher 
of course follows in this tradition. Twardowski’s immediate source of inspiration was 
Alois Höfler’s Logik. It is worth emphasizing that within the school of Brentano, in 
a broad sense, the problem of existential conditioning was strictly connected with 
the problem of the part—whole structure. Existential conditioning was understood 
as obtaining within a whole or, in other words, dependent objects were always seen as 
parts of a whole. This is why Twardowski used the terms „unablösbare“ and „abhän-
gig“ interchangeably. It was a general attitude accepted in Brentano’s school that the 
concepts of part and whole “were preferred to the traditional metaphysical notions 
of genus-species, matter-form, substance-accident, etc. as intuitive, universal and, it 
seemed likely, clearer than the former ones” (Rosiak, 1998, 85). No wonder that the 
notion of existential conditioning was also defined in part—whole terms and was thus 
identified with the concept of inseparability.
Edmund Husserl seems to follow the same path as other students of Brentano. 
In his Logical Investigations he distinguishes two kinds of parts: pieces and moments. 
Roughly speaking this distinction corresponds to Twardowski’s distinction between 
physical and metaphysical parts or the much older distinction between concrete and 
abstract parts. The distinction between pieces and moments can be identified with 
the distinction between separable and inseparable parts. Inseparability is defined by 
Husserl as follows:
The sense of inseparability (Unselbständigkeit) lies likewise in the positive thought of 
dependence (Abhängigkeit). The content is by nature bound to other contents, it cannot 
be, if other contents are not there together with it. We need not emphasize the fact that 
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they form a unity with it, for can there be essential coexistence without connection or 
“blending,” however loose? Contents which lack separability (unselbständige Inhalte) can 
accordingly only exists as partial contents. (Husserl, 2001, 10)5
Inseparable objects are objects belonging to such pure Species as are governed by a law 
of essence to the effect that they only exist (if at all) as parts of the more inclusive wholes 
of a certain appropriate Species. This is what we mean by the terser expression that they 
are parts which only exist as parts that cannot be thought of as existing by themselves. 
(Husserl, 2001, 12)
As we can see, Husserl identifies both inseparability (Unselbständigkeit) and de-
pendence (Abhängigkeit). Inseparable objects must coexist with other objects and be 
united with them as parts of a larger whole. Husserl emphasizes that this necessary co-
existence within a whole is implied by the essence of an inseparable thing. Moreover, 
this essence also determines the species of the whole in question. Husserl also intro-
duces a definition of relative inseparability. According to this definition, an object that 
is a part of whole A is inseparable from A if it must coexist, due to its essence, within 
any whole belonging to the species determined by A or by any part an A (Husserl, 
2001, 22). Finally, Husserl defines inseparability not in relation to a more comprehen-
sive whole, but rather to another part (content) (Husserl, 2001, 22). 
Another concept that plays a significant role in the Husserlian theory of parts 
and wholes is the notion of foundation: “If a law of essence means that an A cannot as 
such exist except in a more comprehensive unity which connects it with an M, we say 
that an A as such requires foundation by an M or also that an A as such needs to be 
supplemented by an M” (Husserl, 2001, 25). Given the definition of relative insepara-
bility we can say that a foundation implies inseparability, but not vice versa (Rosiak, 
1995, 38). For an A is inseparable not only from its foundation in an M but also from 
a whole containing M. Yet, such a whole does not have to found an A. 
Husserl uses the concept of foundation in his definition of the whole. For him, 
some contents compose a whole if they are covered by a single foundation. With this 
subsequently meaning that each content is directly or indirectly connected with all 
other contents with this connection itself being the foundation (Husserl, 2001, 34). 
To avoid a vicious circle, Husserl was forced to remove reference to the concept of the 
whole from the definition of foundation and finally reduced the latter relationship to 
the necessity of coexistence implied by essence: “A content of the species A is founded 
upon a content of the species B, if an A can by its essence […] not exist unless a B also 
exists” (Husserl, 2001, 34). 
5 I revised this translation in accordance with the remarks made in the introduction (see above).
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It is worth remembering that, in his formal ontology, Husserl defines foundation 
as a formal relationship. Husserl’s formal ontology deals with such concepts as “object,” 
“relation,” “property,” “part,” “whole,” and so on. Such concepts are devoid of any quali-
tative content in contrast to material concepts such as “man,” “brotherhood,” “red,” “leg,” 
or “organism.” A foundation is not an additional content pressed between two other 
contents. A foundation is not a regular relation, but is rather a form of direct coexistence 
(Husserl, 2001, 19–20). In other words, formal relationships, such as a foundation or 
inseparability are not additional parts of the whole, which is unified by them.
Some of the early critics of Husserl pointed out that his concept of inseparabil-
ity cannot be applied to all cases of existential conditioning. For example, Ingarden’s 
student — Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein (already mentioned) — noticed that relative 
features existentially condition each other, for example being a wife and being a hus-
band, but they do not make up any whole (Ginsberg, 1982, 273). Unfortunately, Gins-
berg-Blaustein did not develop her intuitions because she focused on an immanent 
criticism of Husserl’s theory which intentionally neglected relational features.
3. ROMAN INGARDEN’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN  
INSEPARABILITY AND DEPENDENCE:  
THE CONTEXT OF DISCOVERY
Ingarden was one of the disciples of Husserl who never accepted the idealistic 
position of his teacher. Initially, the Polish philosopher attacked the idealism—re-
alism controversy on the grounds of both epistemology and ontology, but later this 
second perspective became dominant. Ontology was considered by Ingarden as a dis-
cipline which investigated the content of ideas (Ingarden, 2013, 61-62). When applied 
to the realism—idealism controversy, ontology focuses on the content of the idea of 
the world and on the content of the idea of pure consciousness. One of the results of 
these investigations was a list of possible relationships between the two mentioned 
domains. The relationships in question have an existential character in the sense that 
they are types of possible existential conditionings.
Ingarden formulated the idea that one shall carefully consider the possible re-
lationships between the world and pure consciousness before deciding whether ide-
alism is true, or not, in one of his early letters to Husserl. At the end of July 1918, 
Ingarden wrote to his teacher:
First of all an ontological question arises: is the essence of reality a separable essence and 
is it especially an essence separable from the essence of consciousness — as an essence—, 
or not? Principally spoken, four possibilities are given: 
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(1) Reality (as an essence) is inseparable and the essence of consciousness is separable, 
i.e. the latter could exist without the essence of reality. 
(2) The essence of reality and the essence of consciousness are separable. 
(3) The essence of reality is separable. The essence of consciousness is inseparable. 
(4) Both are inseparable from each other. (Ingarden, 1976, 435–436)6
Here Ingarden seems to use the word “unselbständig” in a looser sense than 
Husserl. Inseparability is just the necessity of coexistence with something else (in this 
case with the world or with pure consciousness). However, Ingarden does not men-
tion that these coexistent objects have to compose a whole. 
In the paper Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus–Realismus, published in 
1929, the Polish phenomenologist distinguishes four types of existential condition-
ings and their opposites, the latter being types of a lack of conditioning:
1. Originality and derivativeness, roughly: x is original iff it is implied by its 
essence that x cannot be produced nor destroyed; x is derivative iff it is implied by its 
essence that x is produced by something else (Ingarden, 1929, 165–166).
2. Autonomy and heteronomy, roughly: x is autonomous iff x has its ontic foun-
dation in itself, i.e. iff all qualities which characterize x are really concretized in x; x is 
heteronomous iff x does not have its ontic foundation in itself, especially if all qualities 
of x are only ascribed to it by another object (i.e. by pure consciousness) (Ingarden, 
1929, 165)7.
3. Separability and inseparability: “An object is existentially separable if for its 
existence it requires no other object which would supplement it within the unity of 
some whole. In other words, its existence is not a necessary coexistence with some 
other object within the unity of a whole. In contrast, an object is existentially insep-
arable if for its existence it requires a coexistence with another […] object within the 
unity of a whole” (Ingarden, 1929, 166–167).
6 I have edited the given English translation. For unknown reasons the translator (or the editor) 
translates “autonomous” and “dependent” as the same word. The original German is as follows: 
„[…] entsteht zunächst eine ontologische Frage: Ist das Wesen der Realität ein selbständiges Wesen 
und speziell ein dem Wesen des Bewusstseins gegenüber selbständiges Wesen — als Wesen — oder 
nicht? Prinzipiell gesprochen liegen 4 Möglichkeiten vor: 1) Realität (als Wesen) unselbständig, das 
Wesen-Bewusstsein selbständig, d.h. dass es ohne das Wesen Realität existieren konnte. 2) Wesen 
der Realität und Wesen des Bewusstsein<s> — selbständig. (3)  Wesen der Realität selbständig. 
Bewusstsein unselbständig, 4) Beides unselbständig und aufeinander angewiesen“ (Husserl, 1994, 
200).
7 These definitions testify that for Ingarden the term “foundation” had a different meaning than for 
Husserl. 
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4. Independence and dependence: “an object is existentially independent, if it is 
existentially separable, and does not require for its existence—according to its materi-
al essence—the existence of any other separable object. In contrast a separable object 
is existentially dependent if, despite its existential separability, it requires, according 
to its essence […] the existence of another separable object” (Ingarden, 1929, 168). 
As we can see, Ingarden follows Husserl’s idea that the listed relationships and 
their opposites are implied by the essences of given objects. This idea was absent in 
Twardowski’s formulations and was what made his concepts closer to the concepts 
of necessary dependence elaborated upon by contemporary analytical philosophers8. 
According to this approach, x is dependent on y iff it is necessary that x exists only if 
y exists. The main problem with this formula is that it makes an object dependent on 
all necessary objects. It is necessary that my dog exists only if trigonometric functions 
exist because the functions are necessary objects and exist in all possible worlds. Yet 
we feel that my dog has nothing to do with, for instance, the sine function. To avoid 
such questionable consequences, it is justified to define dependence and all existential 
conditionings partially in terms of essence. 
The distinguished relationships and their opposites are called existential mo-
ments. Some of them are compatible with each other while some are not. For example: 
independence is incompatible with heteronomy, originality is incompatible with het-
eronomy, inseparability, and dependence; dependence is by definition incompatible 
with inseparability. Complexes of compatible existential moments are called ways of 
being (Ingarden, 2013, 99)9. The Ingardenian approach to the realism—idealism con-
troversy consists in the identification of Husserl’s modes of givenness with ways of 
existence. Combinations of the possible ways of existence of pure consciousness with 
the possible ways of existence of the world are possible solutions to the realism—ide-
alism controversy. In all idealistic solutions, the world is conceived as heteronomous 
with respect to pure consciousness. In realistic solutions, the world is autonomous 
(Ingarden, 2013, 167–226). Husserl’s alleged transcendental idealism is understood 
as the position according to which consciousness is original, autonomous, and inde-
pendent with respect to the world and the world is derivative, heteronomous, sepa-
rable, and dependent with respect to pure consciousness (Ingarden, 2013, 180–181).
In the context of Ingarden’s polemics with Husserl, one can see the first and the 
main motivation for Ingarden’s distinction between inseparability and dependence. 
Husserl was convinced that the world is constituted, in many stages, by pure con-
8 For the modal approach to dependence see (Tahko & Lowe, 2016, section 2).
9 For an analysis of ways of being and existential moments see (Chrudzimski, 2015; Mitscherling, 
1997; Rosiak, 2007; Simons, 2005).
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sciousness. Ingarden conceived this constitution as a product of the so-called purely 
intentional object, i.e., an object that possesses only such properties and essence which 
are ascribed to it by pure consciousness. Thus a constituted object was both derivative 
and heteronomous with respect to pure consciousness. Yet, for Husserl, the constitut-
ed world was transcendent, it did not belong to the sphere of the immanence of pure 
consciousness. Leaving aside all nuances, we can say that this was one of the differ-
ences between Husserl and George Berkeley for whom real objects were bundles of 
ideas immanent to minds (Ingarden, 1931)10. In Ideas I Husserl emphasizes that “It is 
evident then that intuition and intuited, perception and perceived physical thing, are 
more particularly, essentially interrelated but, as matter of essential necessity, are not 
really inherently and essentially one and combined” (Husserl, 1983, 86). The world is 
somehow essentially connected with the sphere of immanence but is not immersed in 
it. In Cartesian Meditations (§ 47), Husserl uses the term “immanent transcendence” 
for this peculiar relationship between a constituted object and pure consciousness 
(Husserl, 1982, 103–105). The Husserlian concepts of inseparability and foundation, 
elaborated upon in the Logical Investigations, were not suitable for expressing this type 
of connection. Ingarden, having his own distinction, would say that for Husserl the 
world is both separable from and dependent upon pure consciousness. 
The distinction between inseparability and dependence was also motivated by 
the problems of Ingarden’s aesthetics. This is unsurprising. Ingarden started to deal 
with aesthetic issues in strict connection with the realism—idealism controversy. 
When Ingarden conceived of noemata as intentional objects and when he came to the 
conclusion that works of art are also intentional objects, his aesthetics was included 
in an attempt to resolve the problem of idealism. Ingarden refuted psychologism on 
the grounds of aesthetics. Works of art can “live” longer than the artists who created 
them and longer than their recipients (readers, listeners, spectators). Hence, works of 
art cannot be parts of individual conscious acts. Yet they are not physical. An artistic 
work is one object, although it can have many physical fundaments. Doctor Faustus is 
one novel, although it can be printed out in many copies. By no means are works of 
art ideal, they start to exist and can be destroyed. Thus, works of art require conscious 
acts in order to exist but they are not parts of these acts: “Purely intentional objects 
are ‘transcendent’ with respect to corresponding, and in general, to all conscious acts 
in the sense that no real element (or moment) of the act is an element of the purely 
intentional object and vice versa. Nevertheless, they belong to the corresponding acts 
10 Of course for Berkeley a mind is not pure consciousness. 
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from which they draw their source; and they constitute a necessary ‘intentional corre-
late’ of acts” (Ingarden, 1973, 118).
Another motivation to introduce the distinction between inseparability and 
dependence was the Platonism of Ingarden’s doctrine. Ingarden accepted Platonism 
in its ontological form. This means that Ingarden was concerned with only the pos-
sibility of ideas and pure ideal qualities and subsequently never decided whether or 
not they exist11. In Essentiale Fragen, an extensive text written earlier than Bemerkun-
gen, Ingarden accepts and creatively develops the main theses of Jean Hering. For 
Ingarden, all qualities that can be found within individual objects are concretizations 
of ideal qualities. The particular redness of the slice of the tomato on my sandwich is 
the concretization of the ideal of redness. Besides ideal qualities we also have ideas. 
Each idea determines the necessary relationships between the qualities of the object 
which instantiates an idea. The idea of a square determines that in objects instantiat-
ing this idea there coincides particular concretizations of ideal qualities, particularly 
equilaterality and equiangularity. According to Ingarden, ideal qualities are absolutely 
transcendent. They are not contained in any particular object nor in ideas. In particu-
lar objects and in the contents of ideas we can find only the counterparts of ideal qual-
ities. Nevertheless, the individual counterparts of some ideal qualities are necessarily 
conditioned by these ideal qualities (Ingarden, 1925, 170–173). In Essentiale Fragen, 
Ingarden uses the term “unselbständigkeit” but he does not define this term at all. The 
term “abhängigkeit” also appears in the paper, yet also is undefined and used only in 
the context of the relation between an object and an act of cognition (Ingarden, 1925, 
263). In his later writings, for example in The Controversy over the Existence of the 
World, Ingarden employs the distinction between inseparability and dependence and 
thus can say that ideal qualities are totally independent and that their concretizations 
are separable from ideal qualities but also dependent on these qualities. A similar 
relationship obtains between individual objects and ideas. The latter are independent 
of their instances. On the other hand, particular objects are separable from ideas but 
also are dependent on them12.
11 However, on the ground of Ingarden’s metaontology we have a problem concerning so-called on-
tological neutrality. Ingarden claims that ontology is not about factual existence, but characterizes 
ontology as an “investigation of the contents of ideas.” This characterization itself suggests that 
ideas factually exist.
12 Ingarden’s mature theory of the domain of the ideal being is presented in (Ingarden, 2016, 225–
265).
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4. INSEPARABILITY AND DEPENDENCE —  
SOME PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
Although the analyzed distinction seems to be very useful it raises some doubts, 
especially when we consider original Ingardenian formulations. In The Controversy, 
Ingarden provides his most mature theory of inseparability and dependence, but the 
definitions given therein are almost the same as those quoted above (Ingarden, 2013, 
147, 153). Ingarden’s most controversial formulation is his definition of inseparability. 
As we could see above, inseparability can be defined as implied by the essence of a 
given object and the necessity of its coexistence with something else within a whole. 
It is quite easy to grasp the idea of inseparability when we take into account the so-
called metaphysical parts of objects, for instance properties or the aspects of pro perties. 
For instance, a particular roundness is inseparable from a particular ball and we under-
stand this fact very well. A redness in itself is somehow incomplete, it requires some sup-
plementation. The same can be said of a particular brightness of redness. But imagine a 
whole composed of some complete objects, complete individual subjects characterized by 
all the properties they should possess. Imagine also that these objects are connected by 
necessary relations, such relations that are the consequences of the essences of the objects 
in question. Ingarden (Ingarden, 2016, 350–355) believed that some properties of an ob-
ject are necessary in the sense that they are implied by the so-called constitutive nature 
of an object, this being the counterpart of Aristotelian essence. Analogically we can con-
ceive of some necessary relations13. A whole composed of some objects united by nece-
ssary relations can be named “a strong organic whole.” Are the objects which compose a 
strong organic whole inseparable from each other? If there are no restrictions imposed on 
the concept of the whole used in the definition of inseparability, we should answer that 
these objects are inseparable from each other. But previously we admitted these objects 
are complete and we intuitively feel that even if they stand in some necessary relation to 
other parts of a strong organic whole, these parts do not supplement each other in the 
same way as redness supplements a tomato or as brightness supplements a redness. We 
are apt to think that inseparable objects, metaphorically speaking, permeate each other 
or are alloyed with each other while dependent objects retain their boundaries although 
they are necessarily connected. If this is true, then the parts of a strong organic whole are 
separable despite the fact they compose a whole and must coexist with each other. 
13 In fact this analogy is rather weak. According to Ingarden, necessary properties are implied directly 
by the nature of a thing and do not depend on any external things. This is why Ingarden called 
these properties unconditionally intrinsic properties. However, necessary relations would be those 
relations which are implied by the nature of a thing but depend on external things as well. I only 
wish to emphasize that necessary regular relations are possible.
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I posit that this last statement corresponds to Ingarden’s theory. Thus, Ingarden’s 
definition of inseparability should be corrected through the imposition of some restric-
tions on the concept of the whole. Fortunately, clues concerning the demanded for a 
correction can be found in Ingarden’s writings. This is because Ingarden distinguishes 
two types of wholes: absolute wholes and summative wholes. Imagine a simple object, 
an object which lacks proper parts in the sense of Husserlian “pieces” (Stücke). Even if 
such an object does not have parts it can be called an absolute whole because it “is fully 
determined in the totality of its material qualification” (Ingarden, 2016, 113). Ingarden 
adds that this fact results in an “object’s all-around unequivocal delimitation and clo-
sure” (Ingarden, 2016, 113). Everything which is complete in itself, and does not have to 
be supplemented, is an absolute whole. Absolute “wholeness” means absolute complete-
ness. Such a whole does not have parts in the regular sense: “the ‘whole’ in the sense just 
given can absolutely not be partitioned into individual properties, or moments within 
these. Also in accordance with the sense of wholeness so understood, nothing can be 
‘contained’ in this ‘whole’ ” (Ingarden, 2016, 113). An absolute whole is just a fully sepa-
rable object within which some aspects can be distinguished but such that they are fully 
supplemented by each other. But what is the reason of the separability of an absolute 
whole and what is the reason for the exhaustive mutual supplementation of the aspects 
of such a whole? I determine the reason for this is that “in the matters that constitute it 
[i.e. the object] there is no continuous transition to other objects, and there is also no 
form that comprehends it and the matter of some other objects, provided it is not a term 
in a relation or in a higher-level entity” (Ingarden, 2016, 78). 
Ingarden also distinguished between material and formal ontology as Husserl 
did. Ingarden understood formal relationships in the same way as Husserl, as being 
non-qualitative (content-less) relationships. Some of these relationships obtain be-
tween separable objects, for example an instantiation (a relationship between an idea 
and an individual object) seems to be a formal relationship. On the other hand, some 
formal relationships obtain between the contents of an object. A complex of such rela-
tionships is called the ontological form of an object. The matter of an object is some-
thing that is united or organized by an ontological form (Ingarden, 2016, 19–43). The 
matter of an object is nothing more than all the qualities which can be found within 
an object. My matter consists of, among other things; my humanity, particular mass, 
height, intellectual powers and so on. The basic form of an individual object is the 
subject—properties structure. Thus, being a subject is one formal relationship among 
many others. Properties perform the function of the characterization of a subject and 
this function is a formal relationship as well. On the other hand, examples of regular 
relations include: brotherhood, parenthood, love, hate, being a student, and so on. 
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In the above quoted passage from The Controversy (Ingarden, 2016, 78), In-
garden clearly states that an ontological form is the principle of the unity of a separa-
ble object. This means that an absolute whole is such a whole whose components are 
united by some formal relationships. The latter are opposed to regular relations which 
include some of the content-full ties between objects. Ingarden states that an object is 
fully complete and separable if none of its qualities are united by a formal relationship 
within a whole, which contains the qualities of another object. Yet, an object does not 
lose its separability if it is the term of a regular relation and together with other objects 
composes a higher-level entity.
“Higher-level entity” is another name for a composed object like a table, a book, 
or a machine. Such an object is grounded upon, but is not identical to, some whole. It 
should be noted that such a whole is a whole in another sense, this whole is a summa-
tive, or relative, whole: “An entity is a ‘whole’ in this new sense only with respect to the 
parts contained in it: it is put together out of them. It is nothing other than the sum of 
all the parts, and is a ‘whole’ only relative to these parts and components” (Ingarden, 
2016, 113). Such a whole is not one unit, it is rather the plurality of some objects. The 
main difference between absolute and summative wholes is that the former are, as we 
have just seen, united by formal relationships and the latter are something “consisting 
of relations and resulting from relations” (Ingarden, 2016, 120). This is why summa-
tive wholes contain only separable objects. 
It is easy to identify that the concept of the absolute whole is entangled in the defini-
tion of inseparability. Of course, it is not true that in all cases two or more inseparable ob-
jects make up some absolute whole. Yet inseparable entities always make up a whole which 
is united by a formal relationship. The incompleteness of an inseparable entity consists, 
among other things, in the necessity of an object being directly supplemented, in being 
supplemented by such an entity which is not attached to an object due to some additional 
relative content such as a regular relation. Therefore, only objects which compose a strong 
organic whole are dependent on each other. Although these objects must coexist due to 
their essences within some whole, they are separable from each other because the whole 
in question is a summative whole, it is a whole united by regular necessary relations.
Having this in mind, we can provide updated definitions of inseparability and 
dependence:
x is inseparable from y iff it is implied by the essence of x that x has to coexist 
with y within a whole united by a formal relationship(s).
x is dependent on y iff it is implied by the essence of x that x has to coexist with 
y and that x and y are not components of a whole united by a formal relationship(s).
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Hence, there are three conditions of inseparability, each flowing from the es-
sence of an inseparable object: (i) necessary coexistence with something else, (ii) be-
ing a component of some whole and (iii) the formal character of the unity of the whole 
in question. Thus, a separable object is an object that does not meet at least one of 
these conditions. In this way we can distinguish three types of separable objects: (i) 
separable objects, which do not have to coexist with anything else, (ii) separable ob-
jects, which have to coexist with something else but do not make up any whole with 
this other object, (iii) separable objects, which have to coexist with something else 
and make up a whole with this other object, but this subsequent whole is not united 
by formal relationships. Objects of the first type are independent while objects of the 
last two types are dependent.
With the updated definition of dependence, I have omitted the original con-
dition, imposed by Ingarden himself, according to which dependence obtains only 
between fully separable objects. I think that this condition incorrectly limits the area 
of possible applications of the concept of dependence. Such a limitation generates 
problems with the ontological status of some properties, particularly the so-called 
externally conditioned properties (Ingarden, 2016, 345–348). Consider the shape of 
a portion of water poured into a glass. The shape is conditioned both by the portion 
of water and by the internal shape of the glass. Yet we feel these ways of conditioning 
differ in both cases. Without the distinction between inseparability and dependence 
we would be unable to express this difference. But with the distinction in mind we can 
say that the shape of the portion of water is inseparable from the portion itself and 
dependent on the internal shape of the glass. However, the concept of dependence 
could not be applied to properties if dependence would obtain only between abso-
lutely separable entities. In fact, we do not need absolute separability in the definition 
of dependence. The relative separability is enough: if x is dependent on y then x must 
be separable from y. This does not exclude the possibility that x is inseparable from 
other entities. Analogically, y does not have to be totally inseparable but rather only 
separable from x.
5. WHAT ARE THE LOGICAL PROPERTIES OF  
INSEPARABILITY AND DEPENDENCE?
Ingarden provided a few typologies of inseparability which were elaborated 
upon through the basis of various criteria (Ingarden, 2016, 148–152):
1. Inseparability comes in different degrees. The inseparability of the brightness 
of the red color of a tomato is of a higher degree than the inseparability of the color 
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red. For the brightness mentioned is inseparable from the redness, the color, and the 
tomato related to it. The redness thereof is inseparable only from the last two entities.
2. With respect to the range of objects from which a given entity is inseparable 
Ingarden distinguishes univocal (rigid) and multivocal (generic) inseparability:
Univocal (or univocally relative) inseparability occurs wherever an S, if it is to be able 
to exist at all as something individual, must be completed into one whole by an S’ that 
is qualitatively, totally, and unequivocally specified and is therefore unique with respect 
to this qualitative endowment. In contrast, multivocal (or multivocally relative) insep-
arability occurs whenever an arbitrary moment from some class containing a plurality 
of mutually exclusive moments can comprise the completing component of moment 
M, which simultaneously always requires one of these moments as such a component. 
(Ingarden, 2016, 149)
The updated definition of inseparability given above is in fact a definition of 
rigid inseparability, of inseparability obtaining with respect to a completely defined 
(determined) entity. All my properties are univocally (rigidly) inseparable from me. 
Yet, I am only generically inseparable from my contingent properties. For example, I 
must have a shape, but not necessarily the one which I have at the moment. 
3. With respect to the source of inseparability we can distinguish material and 
formal inseparability. In the first case, inseparability is caused by the matter of an 
inseparable object, in the second by an object’s ontological form. My particular hu-
manity is materially inseparable from my intellectual powers. Humanity as such is a 
specific quality, which needs to be supplemented by other specific qualities. On the 
other hand, my color is formally inseparable from myself. The inseparability of my 
color is caused not by its qualitative specificity but by the function of characterization 
that it performs with respect to me.
4. Inseparability can be unilateral (one sided) or reciprocal (mutual). I think this 
thesis is easily understandable and as such does not require any commentary.
Furthermore, dependence can be rigid or generic, material or formal, mutual 
or unilateral, and can also come in different degrees. Because existential moments are 
positive relationships (their opposites — separability and independence — are just 
lacks of a given conditioning), we can ask questions concerning the logical properties 
of these moments. We can ask whether they are reflexive, symmetric, or transitive.
It is not clear if whether inseparability is reflexive. Of course no object can exist 
without itself. But does an object make up a whole with itself? Notice that the word 
“whole,” as used in the definition of inseparability, can also be read as “unity.” Insep-
arable entities are formally united. It seems plausible to say that an object makes up 
a formal unity with itself. Moreover, this is the strongest unity because it is based on 
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a special formal relationship, identity. Thus inseparability is reflexive. The case of the 
reflexivity of dependence is now clear. A dependent object cannot make up a formal 
unity with the object upon which it is dependent. Thus dependence is irreflexive. 
Obviously, by introducing his explicit distinction between mutual and unilater-
al inseparability, Ingarden implicitly refutes the thesis that inseparability must always 
be mutual. Thus, inseparability does not seem to be symmetric nor antisymmetric in 
the strict logical sense. However, this issue is more intricate. Notice that Ingarden ap-
plies the distinction between unilateral and mutual inseparability only to rigid insep-
arability. Yet such a restriction seems to be too arbitrary. In the example I mentioned 
above, the inseparability that obtains between a subject and its contingent properties 
is more complicated. This inseparability is mutual, but in the sense that a subject is 
generically inseparable from each contingent property and each contingent property 
is rigidly inseparable from its subject. At first glance, there are three possible cases of 
mutual inseparability between two entities: (i) rigid in both directions, (ii) generic in 
both directions, and (iii) rigid in one direction but generic in the other. An example 
of (i) is a subject and one of its necessary properties: a particular square is rigidly in-
separable from a particular equilaterality and vice versa. An example of (iii) has been 
already given: a subject and its particular contingent property. Two particular contin-
gent properties which characterize one and the same subject can serve as an example 
of (ii). My skin color must coexist with my body shape but both can change, I can be 
red and bent or pale and straight. Yet I must have some color and some shape. Hence, 
these objects are mutually and generically inseparable. These three situations are also 
purely possible (mutatis mutandis) in the case of dependence. 
In this context we can raise another question. Is it necessary that if x is (rigidly 
or generically) inseparable from y, then y is at least generically inseparable from x? In 
my opinion, we should answer this question in the positive and perhaps in opposition 
to Ingarden. As I have said, an inseparable entity is somehow incomplete and makes 
up a formal unity with another entity. Yet notice that making up a unity seems to be 
symmetric. If x is united with y, then y is united with x. Moreover, this is a formal 
unity. Yet if y would be separable from x, then y could be united with x only through a 
regular relation. This would mean that y makes up a summative whole with x while x 
makes up a formal unity with y. This seems untenable. Thus, I think that the comple-
ment of an inseparable entity must be at least generically inseparable from this same 
entity. It is evident that an analogical statement is not true in the case of dependence, 
because dependent objects are not formally united with the objects upon which they 
are dependent. Thus x’s dependence on y is not necessarily associated with y’s rigid or 
generic dependence on x. 
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The transitivity of dependence does not raise any doubts. If x is dependent on y 
and y is dependent on z, then x is dependent on z. Imagine that a sort of Christian Pla-
tonism is true and God creates ideas and sustains them in existence. If this is the case, 
then individual objects are dependent on ideas and are dependent on God, because 
ideas also depend on God. The transitivity of inseparability is more controversial al-
though Ingarden presupposes it in his thesis concerning the degrees of inseparability. 
Is a particular brightness inseparable from a particular tomato, if the brightness is 
inseparable from a particular redness and the redness is inseparable from the tomato 
in question? One could say that in this case, the brightness does not make up a direct 
unity with the tomato and therefore the tomato does not supplement the concerned 
brightness. Moreover, the whole “brightness + redness” is different from the whole 
“redness + tomato.” 
My response to the second objection is the following. In the definition of in-
separability, the identity of a whole is not specified. Surely brightness, redness, and 
the tomato make up one whole that is united by formal relationships. It is then sub-
sequently true that the brightness of the tomato and the tomato itself coexist within 
such a whole.
The first objection is more problematic. It is true that the brightness and the to-
mato are not directly united, but are united via redness. Yet notice that redness is not 
a relation between the brightness and the tomato. The same should be said about the 
subject of a particular mass and of a particular shape. A subject ties together a mass 
and a shape not because it is a relation between them, but because a subject is generi-
cally inseparable from its properties and these properties are rigidly inseparable from 
their respective subject. It is still true that the brightness and the tomato or my mass 
and my shape must coexist within one whole, which is not united by regular relations. 
The lesson from these considerations is that a relationship of being directly comple-
mented must not be identified with inseparability. Being directly complemented im-
plies inseparability but not vice versa. Nevertheless, inseparability always obtains due 
to some complementation, but not necessarily due to a complementation obtaining 
directly between the two inseparable entities in question.
With this, there is one final issue. In the case of the transitivity of inseparability, 
as understood above, generic inseparability is dominant over rigid inseperability. If 
x is rigidly inseparable from y, and y is generically inseparable from z, then x is only 
generically inseparable from z. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Philosophers from the school of Brentano used to define ontological depend-
ence within the context of part—whole theories. Thus, according to the Brentanians, 
dependencies always obtain between the parts of a whole. Twardowski is a typical 
representative of this tradition. In his doctrine, different types of dependence are in 
fact types of a part’s inseparability. Husserl is also strongly rooted in this tradition. 
Yet Ingarden, Husserl’s disciple, noticed that such an approach to dependence was 
too narrow and suggested a more nuanced doctrine of existential moments. One of 
Ingarden’s distinctions, i.e., the distinction between inseparability and dependence, 
has a more general significance to ontology. Ingarden’s motivation to introduce such a 
distinction was strongly connected with his approach to the problem of idealism, with 
his aesthetics, and with his theory of ideas. However, this distinction is also applicable 
beyond these areas. Ingarden’s definitions need some clarifications. Ingarden’s notion 
of a whole, which appears in his definition of inseparability, should especially be de-
fined as a formal whole, that is, as a whole based on a formal relationship. Such wholes 
should be distinguished from summative wholes that are united with regular rela-
tions. Inseparability has quite interesting features. It is reflexive (unlike dependence), 
transitive (in a special sense) and can be mutual. The distinction between insepa-
rability and dependence is a very valuable tool which allows us to express different 
ontological situations.
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